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In the early stages of motorization, it did not take rigorous scientific research to 
achieve major improvements in traffic safety.  Instead, early traffic-safety 
countermeasures were often based exclusively on common sense (Sivak, 2002).  Since 
then, scientific research has gradually increased in importance as the basis for developing 
successful interventions.  This shift was not made by choice but mostly by necessity:  
Many of the “easy” problems have already been addressed, and the remaining problems 
are generally too complex for an approach based on common sense.  Fortunately, our 
understanding of the complexities involved in traffic safety has recently made major 
gains, and common sense can now be supplemented, to some degree, by valid technical 
analysis.  For recent comprehensive reviews of the current state of the art (or better, 
science), see Elvik and Vaa (2004), Evans (2004), and Shinar (2006). 
This report will discuss major conceptual issues that should be considered in 
guiding the future development of effective, science-based traffic-safety 
countermeasures.  After briefly discussing the issues, the report will offer a list of 




The starting point of our discussion is an approach to total harm proposed by 
Thulin and Nilsson (1994).  In this approach, total harm is conceptualized as a product of 











Figure 1.  Total harm as the volume formed by a three-dimensional space of exposure, 
risk, and consequences.  (Adapted from Thulin and Nilsson [1994].) 
 
Exposure is the probability of a particular event (condition, situation) per distance 
traveled.  Risk is the conditional probability of a crash, given the event in question.  
Consequence is the conditional probability of a fatality (or a particular level of injury), 
given a crash that was precipitated by the event in question.  For each event, the values 
along the three dimensions (exposure, risk, and consequences) define a three-dimensional 
space.  The volume of this space is the total harm for this particular event.  (We recently 
used this general framework in addressing current and anticipated road safety issues in 
China [Zhang, Tsimhoni, Sivak, and Flannagan, 2008].) 
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There are several important implications of this approach.  First, a high value of 
total harm can be a consequence of a high value along any of the three dimensions.  This 
is illustrated in Figure 2 that shows annual mileage (exposure), likelihood of a crash per 
distance driven (risk), and likelihood of a fatality per crash (consequence) by driver age.  
Total harm for different age groups is carried primarily by different dimensions: risk for 














Figure 2.  A schematic illustration of the total harm of road crashes (as a combination of 
exposure, risk, and consequences) by driver age in developed countries.  Total harm for 
each age group is the volume of the corresponding three-dimensional space.  (Adapted 
from Thulin and Nilsson [1994].)   
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The second important implication of this approach is that proportional changes in 
any of the three dimensions are equivalent in terms of the resultant changes in total harm.  
For example, a 25% decrease in exposure is functionally equivalent to a 25% decrease in 
risk or a 25% decrease in consequences.   
The third implication, and a corollary to the previous one, is that effective 
interventions are not necessarily those that address the most dominant dimension of the 
problem.  Let’s again consider the age effect example in Figure 2.  As indicated earlier, 
the total harm for young drivers is carried primarily by risk.  Nevertheless, a 25% 




When considering public health priorities in addressing preventable harm (deaths 
and injuries), knowledge concerning total harm needs to be supplemented with the facts 
about our current ability to change the situation.  Therefore, amenability of total harm to 
intervention is of importance.  Let’s consider the following two scenarios (see Table 1).  
In Scenario 1, the total harm corresponds to 1,000 units (e.g., fatalities, serious injuries, 
etc.), and an available countermeasure can cut the harm by 50% (to 500 units).  In 
Scenario 2, the total harm corresponds to 2,000 units, and another countermeasure can 
reduce the harm by 10% (to 1,800 units).  In this example, addressing Scenario 1 would 
reduce the harm by more units, despite the fact that the baseline level of total harm is 
lower here than in Scenario 2.  This is the case because addressing Scenario 1 would 
reduce total harm by 500 units, as opposed to 200 units if addressing Scenario 2. 
 
Table 1 
Baseline level of total harm, amenability, and net benefits. 
Scenario 
Baseline level of total harm 
 (arbitrary units) 




1 1,000 50 500 
2 2,000 10 200 
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Amenability of total harm could be due to the amenability of any of its three 
components: exposure, risk, or consequences (see Figure 3).  Let us consider an example 
of total harm from crashes due to making unprotected left turns across traffic.  The total 
harm here could be reduced by interventions along any of the three dimensions of the 
space.  For example, exposure could be reduced by increasing the frequency of locations 
where left turns are not allowed or by installing more left-turn arrows.  Risk could be 
lowered by installing collision-warning systems or by reducing the posted speed.  Finally, 
consequence could be minimized by installing side-impact and curtain airbags, or by 



















 Each countermeasure has an associated cost that needs to be compared to the 
benefits gained.  However, there are two broad classes of problems in doing such a cost-
benefit analysis.  The first class of complexities concerns the estimated costs: Some of 
the costs are in actual dollars (e.g., the cost of a device, such as an additional left-turn 
arrow), while other costs are in imputed dollars (e.g., of lost wages). 
The second class of complexities relates to estimating the value of the benefits.   
Let’s consider the valuation of life (e.g., Trawen, Maraste, and Persson, 2002; Viscusi 
and Aldy, 2003; Saelensminde, 2003).  There are three types of sub-costs: direct 
(emergency and medical treatment, funeral, and damage to property), lost production, and 
pain/suffering (Saelensminde, 2003).  Because the official valuations differ in what is 
included in the final figure, there is a large variation among countries in the valuation of 
life, even when adjusting for purchasing power of the currencies.  For example, the 
purchasing-power-parity-adjusted value in the U.S. is $3,600,000, while in Portugal it is 
$56,000 (Saelensminde, 2003).  Consequently, even if the estimated cost of a given 
countermeasure and its effectiveness were to be the same in these two countries, the 
countermeasure might turn out to be cost-beneficial in the U.S., but not in Portugal. 
 
Future effectiveness of a given countermeasure 
The effectiveness of many countermeasures depends on societal circumstances 
that may change with time, such as the age distribution of drivers, and the degree of 
intoxicated driving, driving without using safety belts, and speeding.  Consequently, as 
such societal patterns change, so do the benefits of many countermeasures.  Accurate 
predictions about changes in such societal patterns are thus prerequisites for estimating 
future benefits of many countermeasures.  Research on modeling the relationships 
between the influence of societal patterns on the benefits of existing and planned 
countermeasures is ongoing (Flannagan and Flannagan, 2007).     
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Law of increasing returns 
The effects of many interventions are more substantial on relatively unsafe drivers 
than on relatively safe drivers.  This is the case because unsafe drivers tend to be unsafe 
in numerous aspects.  For example, drivers who do not wear safety belts are also the 
drivers who are more likely to be involved in crashes and have more severe crashes 
(Evans, 2004).  Thus, a given percentage change in safety belt use reduces the total 
fatalities more as the baseline level increases.  This argument applies to other 
interventions such as the control of speeding and of driving while intoxicated.  It follows 
that achieving success in terms of safety belt use, not driving while intoxicated, and speed 
control with the remaining drivers that currently still transgress is not a matter of 
diminishing returns, but just the opposite.  Evans (2004) refers to this as the law of 
increasing returns. 
 
Micro and macro adaptation 
 Because of behavioral adaptation, some countermeasures do not work as intended.  
An extreme version of behavioral adaptation—risk compensation or homeostasis— posits 
that drivers adjust their behavior to maintain a constant level of perceived risk (e.g., 
Adams, 1985; Wilde, 1989).  For example, this theory would postulate that drivers reduce 
their speed when driving on ice in such a way that the resulting risk of being involved in 
a crash remains approximately the same as on dry pavement.  Although there are serious 
reservations about this extreme version of behavioral adaptation, there is experimental 
evidence that drivers do adjust their behavior in response to perceived changes in risk.   
For example, drivers on ice chose higher speeds when equipped with studded tires 
compared to standard tires (Rumar, Berggrund, Jernberg, and Ytterbom, 1976).  
However, the adaptation was only partial:  The increase in speed was not large enough to 
fully negate the benefits of increased friction with studded tires. 
Clearly, if the driver is not aware of the countermeasure, even partial risk 
compensation is not possible.  Consequently, everything being equal, countermeasures 
that are not obvious to traffic participants are preferred to those that are. 
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 Risk compensation could be considered an example of micro adaptation.  There is 
also a more subtle form of adaptation that involves macro adaptation.  An example, 
involving modal shift, comes from research on driver licensing.   Hakamies-Blomqvist, 
Johansson, and Lundberg (1996) compared crash involvement of older drivers in Sweden 
(with very liberal licensing laws of older drivers) and Finland (with relatively strict 
licensing).  The results indicated that the age-related patterns of driver crashes were 
similar in the two countries.  However, fatalities among pedestrians and bicyclists 
increased more sharply with age in Finland than in Sweden, suggesting a shift to more 
risky modes of transportation in the country with stricter licensing of older drivers. 
 
Complex effects of countermeasures 
 Most countermeasures have not only some degree of the desired effect but also 
some degree of undesired effect.  Examples include wider A, B, and C pillars (increased 
roof strength, decreased visibility out of the cabin), safety belts (increased protection in a 
crash, decreased mobility after a crash), higher mounting position of headlamps 
(increased visibility for the user, increased glare for oncoming and preceding traffic), and 
daytime running lights (increased visibility of the user, decreased relative visibility of 
non-users such as bicyclists).  
 
Interactions of contributing factors 
Road crashes are consequences of a complex interplay of driver, vehicular, and 
environmental factors.  This broad statement applies even to those crashes that, on the 
face of it, were caused by a single, “simple” factor.  Let’s consider the following example 
of a 4 a.m., run-off-the road crash that was classified by police as caused by a drowsy 
driver.  Yes, if the driver in question did not drive past his or her “bedtime” (driver 
factor) the crash would not have occurred.  However, the crash could have also been 
prevented by a drowsy-driver detection system (a vehicular factor), a road-departure 
warning system (a vehicular factor), or an effective rumble strip that alerts the driver if 
leaving the lane (environmental factor). 
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Interactions among countermeasures 
 Interactions are present among many countermeasures.  Three different types of 
interactions are worth noting.  The first type of interaction is the influence of one 
countermeasure on the opportunity of another countermeasure to reduce harm.  Let’s 
consider electronic stability control and curve-speed advisor systems.  The potential 
benefits of curve-speed advisor systems are reduced by the presence of electronic 
stability control, because there are fewer instances where the advisor is potentially 
relevant. 
 The second type of interaction relates to the effect of one countermeasure on the 
desirable properties of another countermeasure.  A good example here involves safety 
belts and airbags.  In the U.S., the first generation of airbags was designed to save not 
only belted but also unbelted drivers.  Consequently, they tended to be too aggressive for 
belted persons and led to the deaths of some smaller belted drivers and children (e.g., 
Ferguson and Schneider, in press).   
The third type of interaction deals with the effectiveness of different 
countermeasures.  Specifically, a countermeasure can have a negative or a positive 
influence on the effectiveness of another countermeasure.  An example of a negative 
(detrimental) influence involves the effect of daytime running lights on the conspicuity of 
adjacent turn signals.  On the other hand, an example of a positive (synergistic) influence 
is the effect of safety belts on the effectiveness of airbags (due to the control of the 
position of the occupant).    
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Implications for action 
 Based on the above discussion, here is a recommended checklist for action: 
(1) Concentrate on total harm (as opposed to exposure, crash risk, or consequences). 
(2) Deal with the most amenable of the three underlying dimensions of total harm 
(exposure, crash risk, or consequences). 
(3) Consider the multiple sources of uncertainty in estimating costs and benefits. 
(4) Be sensitive to current and expected societal trends. 
(5) Pay attention to the law of increasing returns. 
(6) Take into consideration micro and macro adaptation on the part of traffic 
participants. 
(7) Consider the complex effects of most countermeasures. 
(8) Be aware of interactions among contributing factors. 
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